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The Governance of the Union: Consultation, Co-operation and Legislative consent Contents

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The Governance of the Union: Consultation, Co-operation and Legislative consent

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.This Committee has a long history of examining the constitutional aspects of devolution. In March 2015 we published Proposals for the devolution of further powers to Scotland, in which we assessed recommendations by the Smith Commission,1 and Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom, in which we examined the intergovernmental relations structures in place at that time and made recommendations for their improvement.2 In May 2016, in The Union and Devolution, we raised concerns about a haphazard approach to devolution and urged the then Government to use intergovernmental relations structures to “engage with the devolved institutions across the whole breadth of government policy, co-operating and collaborating where possible.”3

2.In 2022 we published Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for the 21st Century.4 In that report we identified a deterioration in relationships between the UK Government and the devolved administrations, driven by a perceived lack of co-operation and respect in intergovernmental relations and insufficient commitment to the process of consultation and engagement between the governments of the UK.

3.We emphasised this Committee’s belief in the United Kingdom as a joint endeavour and “shared asset for all our nations, regions and communities.” We recognised the strain the Union was under, having faced—among other events—the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and the COVID-19 pandemic.5 We also emphasised the importance of attitudes and culture, alongside structures, to help reinforce the Union, concluding that: “Improving the shared governance of the United Kingdom will require a greater degree of respect and partnership between the different layers of government”6

4.Since we published Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for the 21st Century, new intergovernmental relations structures—established in January 2022—have been put into place. In that report we said:

“[S]trengthening the intergovernmental structures will achieve only so much. The success of the new arrangements will depend on how the Government and devolved administrations operate them and whether they are committed to using the new structures to cooperate on achieving shared objectives, rather than simply managing—or taking opportunities to accentuate—their differences.”7

5.The inquiry which led to this report focussed on the effectiveness or otherwise of the intergovernmental relations arrangements in place since January 2022, building as they do on incremental developments over the past two decades. It also examined respect for and observance of the Sewel convention in recent years. Now is an opportune moment to assess whether the extraordinary strain Brexit and COVID-19 placed on the Union still persist, and whether the new structures—and the attitudes and culture that accompany them—are sufficiently robust to withstand future stresses and strains as they arise.

6.In this introductory chapter we explore the history of intergovernmental relations and the Sewel convention, addressing how Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic have affected the operation of each.

The evolution of intergovernmental relations

7.‘Intergovernmental relations’ refers to engagement between the UK Government and the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Northern Ireland Executive. The term includes all contact between ministers and officials in the UK Government and the governments of the devolved administrations.

8.In 1999 a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was agreed by the four administrations. Although updated in October 2013, the MoU established a framework and formal structures for intergovernmental relations8 which remained essentially unchanged until January 2022 when the new intergovernmental relations structures, currently in place, were introduced.9

9.The 1999 MoU established a forum comprising ministers from the UK and devolved governments: the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC). This operated on three levels: plenary, functional and official. The primary forum, the JMC (Plenary), was usually attended by the heads of the four governments and the three territorial secretaries of state and other relevant ministers from each government. There were two standing sub-committees, JMC (Europe) and JMC (Domestic), as well as a series of ad hoc committees established to deliver specific objectives: JMC (Poverty), JMC (Knowledge Economy) and JMC (Health). JMC (European Negotiations) was established later to manage intergovernmental relations during the UK’s departure from the European Union. The Finance Ministers’ Quadrilateral (FMQ) and the Agriculture Quadrilateral, which were not technically sub-committees of the JMC, also met during this period.10

10.Between 2002 and 2007 the JMC (Plenary) ceased to meet but was reconvened in June 2008 at the request of the then First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond.11 Until December 2018 the JMC (Plenary) was routinely hosted in London by the UK Government.12

11.Since 1999 intergovernmental relations has also been characterised by engagement at official-level. In 2015 in Intergovernmental Relations in the United Kingdom we observed: “The majority of inter-governmental interactions take place between ministers and officials in UK Government departments and devolved administrations, outside the formal structures of the JMC … Relations between officials and ministers in UK Government departments and in the devolved administrations are thus a vital part of the inter-governmental relations in the UK.”13

Intergovernmental relations structures introduced in January 2022

12.At a meeting of the JMC (Plenary) on 14 March 2018 ministers agreed that:

“[O]fficials should review and report to Ministers on the existing intergovernmental structures, including the Memorandum of Understanding, to ensure they are fit for purpose in light of the UK’s exit from the EU.”14

13.This became ‘The Review of Intergovernmental Relations’, undertaken jointly by the UK government and the devolved administrations. Alongside this review, Lord Dunlop—former minister in the Scotland and Northern Ireland Offices from 2015 to 2017—undertook an extensive review into UK Government Union capability. This was published on 24 March 2021, 16 months after it was completed.15

14.Following both reviews, on 13 January 2022, the Cabinet Office and Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC)16 published a policy document setting out the conclusions of ‘The Review of Intergovernmental Relations’. This outlined new intergovernmental relations structures and ways of working to “support our COVID recovery, tackle the climate change crisis and inequalities, and deliver sustainable growth”. The then Government said the new structures were:

“built on principles of mutual respect and trust, respecting the reserved powers of the UK Government and Parliament and the devolved competences of the Scottish Government, Welsh Government, Northern Ireland Executive and their legislatures. The new system will provide a positive basis for productive relations, facilitating dialogue where views are aligned and resolution mechanisms where they are not.”17

15.The new intergovernmental relations structures consist of three tiers:

• Tier 1: Governments are committed to regular portfolio-level engagement on areas of mutual interest through formal Interministerial Groups (IMGs). IMGs are expected to cover a number of policy areas and meet on a quadrilateral basis with established terms of reference. The intergovernmental relations review said: “It may be more appropriate in some areas for engagement to be less frequent or in a different format, for example bilaterally, with exact format determined jointly.”
• Middle tiers: The Interministerial Standing Committee (IMSC) is expected to “consider issues which cannot be considered at the portfolio-level within the relevant IMG, to bring together strategic considerations affecting many different portfolios and to discuss any cross-cutting international issues.” It provides oversight of all IMGs and has a remit to consider all policy areas of mutual interest, both domestic and international, “if they have a bearing on the wider relationships between the governments.” The IMSC is expected to meet every other month “but could meet more or less frequently according to need and if agreed by consensus.” It can also consider issues that have been delegated to it and is responsible for “ensuring the effectiveness of portfolio-level engagement”.

In addition, time-limited Interministerial Committees (ICs) are expected to be established by consensus if particular issues “are identified as needing in-depth and focused consideration by ministers”.

The Finance Interministerial Standing Committee (F:ISC) consists of representatives of the Treasury and the devolved governments’ finance ministers. The F:ISC sits alongside the IMSC and has similar operating arrangements. It is supported by a joint secretariat drawn from representatives of each minister’s department. ‘The Review of Intergovernmental Relations’ stipulates, however, that “all parties acknowledge that policy decisions on funding are strictly reserved to Treasury ministers, with engagement with the devolved administrations as appropriate.”18

• Top tier: The Prime Minister and Heads of Devolved Governments Council oversees all intergovernmental relations in the UK. All middle-tier and portfolio engagement is accountable to this forum. Meetings are chaired by the Prime Minister. The intergovernmental relations review said: “In addition, it is anticipated the Prime Minister will engage with First Ministers and other parties, for example local leaders, outside of these structures.”19

16.The below graphic provides an overview of the intergovernmental relations structures:

Figure 1: Intergovernmental relations structures

17.Collaborative working by all four governments through the new structures is based on the following principles. In Chapter 3 we recommend that a principle of positive engagement be added to the below list of principles.

• “Maintaining positive and constructive relations, based on mutual respect for the responsibilities of the governments and their shared role in the governance of the UK;
• Building and maintaining trust, based on effective communication;
• Sharing information and respecting confidentiality;
• Promoting understanding of, and accountability for, their intergovernmental activity;
• Resolving disputes according to a clear and agreed process.”20

18.The review of intergovernmental relations made clear that the reformed structures “provide a statement of political intent, but are not intended to create new, or override existing, legal relations or obligations, or to be justiciable.” It also said that the new structures would be kept under review.21

19.An Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat was established in 2023 “to provide administrative support and promote the efficient and effective maintenance of relations at each tier and for the handling and resolution of disputes.” It is expected to consist of officials from all four governments.22

20.All four governments are “committed to promoting collaboration and the avoidance of disagreements.” Nonetheless, the new intergovernmental relations structures introduced a dispute resolution process. Where a disagreement arises which cannot be resolved following “due and full consideration” at portfolio level and has “significant implications for the relationship between two or more governments”, any of the four governments may refer it to the Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat as a dispute.23 This process is discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.

21.Overall responsibility for intergovernmental relations sits with the Prime Minister, the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales and the First and deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland.24 However, as we noted in Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for the 21st century:

“The governance of the United Kingdom requires strong relationships to be built and maintained between the UK Government, the Scottish and Welsh Governments and the Northern Ireland Executive at all levels: between the Prime Minister, First Ministers and deputy First Minister, and other ministers, and officials from all four administrations.”25

22.The efficacy of the new intergovernmental relations structures also depends on wider machinery of government choices. In particular, whether a senior cabinet position holds responsibility for the operation of intergovernmental relations and the devolution arrangements more generally. This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.

23.‘The Review of Intergovernmental Relations’ policy document states that:

“The review … introduces a new era for [intergovernmental relations] with improved reporting on intergovernmental activity, providing greater transparency, accountability and scrutiny from each government’s respective legislatures.”26

24.As such, all four governments have committed to “enhanced reporting to their respective legislatures” in order to increase transparency and accountability.27 We discuss this further in Chapter 2. In addition, the UK Government produces quarterly and annual reports on intergovernmental relations activity.28

25.In its 2024 manifesto, the Labour party committed to deepen devolution settlements for existing Combined Authorities and widen devolution to more areas.29 The Labour party also outlined plans to establish a new Council of the Nations and Regions, which will bring together the Prime Minister, the heads of the devolved governments and the mayors of combined authorities.30 Although outside the scope of this inquiry, this is a development that could carry implications for the functioning of the new intergovernmental relations structures and should be examined carefully.

Key changes to the intergovernmental relations process

26.The true efficacy of the new intergovernmental relations structures—and the extent to which they will improve the previous structures—depends on how they are operated in practice. This is discussed in Chapter 2. However, in the paragraphs below we have outlined some of the key differences between the previous intergovernmental relations structures and those introduced in January 2022.

27.Criticisms made of the Joint Ministerial Committee structures, in place prior to January 2022, were that they lacked transparency, were overly reliant on informal relationships and did not meet regularly. Meeting minutes were not always made available, and the Joint Ministerial Committee annual report was not always published annually. Where these documents were published, they lacked detail, providing little insight into the substance of discussions or disputes, and limiting the ability of legislatures or the electorate to hold governments to account for intergovernmental activity.31

28.In 2002 this Committee concluded that under the old system contact between the four administrations was “highly informal” and took place outside the Joint Ministerial Committee structures. We recommended greater use of formal intergovernmental relations mechanisms, which were “likely to become increasingly important when governments of different political persuasions have to deal with each other.”32 In 2018 the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee said: “The absence of formal and effective inter-governmental relations mechanisms has been the missing part of the devolution settlement ever since devolution was established in 1998.”33 Joint Ministerial Committee meetings were further criticised for often taking place at short notice and for long periods of unexplained inactivity.

29.The previous structures lacked a satisfactory process for resolving disputes. A ‘Protocol for Avoidance and Resolution of Disputes’ was agreed in 2010 but the Protocol was criticised for allowing dispute panels to be chaired by a UK Government minister, undermining the devolved governments’ confidence in the process.34

30.On their face, the new structures introduced in January 2022 go some way to addressing these concerns. Formal groups (described under the tier system above) are now in place, with published terms of reference35 and an expectation that they meet at least semi-regularly and not just “when needed”.36 The UK Government’s quarterly and annual reports on intergovernmental relations provide some detail of intergovernmental working through case studies.37 A more formal dispute resolution process—with a clear set of criteria for assessment and escalation and a requirement that meetings are not be chaired by a representative or minister from a government party to the dispute—is now in place (discussed in more detail in Chapter 2).

The Sewel convention

31.The Sewel convention—also known as legislative consent—applies when the UK Parliament intends to legislate on a matter within the devolved competence of the Scottish Parliament, the Senedd or the Northern Ireland Assembly. Under the terms of the convention the UK Parliament will “not normally” do so without the relevant devolved legislature having passed a legislative consent motion.38

32.This commitment was made by Lord Sewel—then Minister in the Scotland Office—when he led the Scotland Bill 1998 through the House of Lords. He said:

“[T]he devolution of legislative competence to the Scottish parliament does not affect the ability of Westminster to legislate for Scotland even in relation to devolved matters … However, as happened in Northern Ireland earlier in the century, we would expect a convention to be established that Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish parliament.”39

33.As noted by Lord Sewel, an analogous convention operated in relation to the devolved Parliament and Government in Northern Ireland between 1921 and 1972.40

34.The convention was incorporated into a Memorandum of Understanding agreed by the UK Government and the devolved administrations in December 2001. The most recent iteration of this Memorandum of Understanding—published in October 2013—stated:

“The United Kingdom Parliament retains authority to legislate on any issue, whether devolved or not. It is ultimately for Parliament to decide what use to make of that power. However, the UK Government will proceed in accordance with the convention that the UK Parliament would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters except with the agreement of the devolved legislature. The devolved administrations will be responsible for seeking such agreement as may be required for this purpose on an approach from the UK Government.”41

35.Following this, the Cabinet Office produced a series of Devolution Guidance Notes (DGNs), which provide guidance to civil servants by setting out working arrangements between the UK Government and the devolved administrations. The DGNs stipulate that prior to submitting a bill to the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee, there should have been prior consultation with the devolved administrations, where relevant, and any issues should be “substantially resolved”.42

36.The Sewel convention was later stated in the Scotland Act 2016, which inserted sub-section (8) into section 28 of the Scotland Act 1998.43 Subsections (7) and (8) now state:

“(7) This section does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland.

(8) But it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.”44

A substantially identical provision was inserted into the Government of Wales Act 2006 (section 107(6)).45

37.However, the Sewel convention remains a convention and has no legal effects—as was confirmed by the UK Supreme Court in R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. The Court stated: “Judges … are neither the parents nor the guardians of political conventions; they are merely observers.” The Court said that, by recognising the Sewel convention in section 28(8) of the Scotland Act 1998 the UK Parliament was not “seeking to convert the Sewel Convention into a rule which can be interpreted, let alone enforced, by the courts; rather, it is recognising the convention for what it is, namely a political convention, and is effectively declaring that it is a permanent feature of the relevant devolution settlement.”46

38.In our report Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for the 21st Century we explained the process for seeking the consent of a devolved legislature:

“Once a bill has been introduced in either House of Parliament, a devolved legislature will indicate its consent by passing a legislative consent motion in accordance with its standing orders, after the relevant committee has considered a legislative consent memorandum from its devolved administration, which is normally lodged within two weeks of a bill’s introduction in the UK Parliament. Subsequent memorandums and motions may be required if bills are amended. The approval or refusal of a legislative consent motion is notified by the clerk of the relevant devolved legislature to the clerks of the two Houses. The letters and associated memoranda are published on the bill pages on parliament.uk. When legislative consent is refused by a devolved legislature an italic note appears on the list of public bills in House of Lords Business to signify that consent has been granted or refused.”47

39.Following our recommendations in Brexit legislation: constitutional issues and Respect and Co-operation: Building a strong Union for the 21st Century, a devolved legislature’s consent, or lack of consent, is now given greater prominence in the legislative process.48 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

Intergovernmental relations and the Sewel convention during Brexit and COVID-19

40.In our reports Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for the 21st Century and COVID-19 and the use and scrutiny of emergency powers we examined the impact of Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic on intergovernmental relations and the operation of the Sewel convention. We have summarised our findings from those reports below, which provides important context for this report.

41.In Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for the 21st Century we noted a view held by some witnesses that Brexit and COVID-19 had “highlighted the deficiencies” in the intergovernmental relations arrangements in place at the time.49 We also observed that “[w]hile the legislative consent procedure generally worked well from 1999, implementing Brexit placed it under strain.”50

Brexit

42.In providing evidence for Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for the 21st Century several witnesses told us that the implementation of Brexit had “undermined the Union and increased tensions between its constituent nations”. The Rt Hon Angus Robertson MSP, the Scottish Government’s Cabinet Secretary for the Constitution, External Affairs and Culture, and Mark Drakeford MS, the then First Minister of Wales, “both claimed that the UK Government was hostile to devolution and had used Brexit to recentralise powers”. Mr Robertson said the UK Government had used Brexit to “drive a coach and horses through intergovernmental relationships as they are supposed to work” and expressed regret that the initially positive approach to common frameworks had been undermined by the Internal Market Act 2020.51

43.In our report we observed:

“Brexit created the prospect that the UK and devolved legislatures would have greater discretion to exercise their existing powers, once they were no longer constrained by EU law. Following the Brexit referendum, several key bills deemed necessary by the UK Government to implement Brexit contained significant implications for the powers of the devolved institutions. The UK Government maintained that this Brexit legislation extended the reach of devolved powers or left them unaffected, but the Scottish and Welsh Governments criticised what they perceived to be new constraints on their ability to exercise these powers, particularly through the UK Internal Market Act 2020. The subsequent disagreements between the four administrations led to the UK Parliament on several occasions legislating in relation to devolved matters without the consent of one or more of the devolved legislatures.”52

44.For example, the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2018, as introduced to Parliament, allowed the UK Government to temporarily restrict the ability of devolved administrations to modify retained EU law, and was criticised by the Scottish and Welsh Governments. In response, the UK Government introduced several amendments to address their concerns, substantially rewriting the relevant provisions and introducing a number of safeguards in relation to the exercise of powers by UK ministers in devolved areas. While the Senedd did eventually provide its consent to the Bill, the Scottish Parliament did not, and instead the Scottish Government went on ‘Sewel strike’, announcing it would not seek the Scottish Parliament’s consent for subsequent Brexit-related legislation, though it did make exceptions.53

45.The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 202054 passed without legislative consent from the Scottish Parliament, the Senedd or the Northern Ireland Assembly. This was the first time a bill engaged the competence of all three devolved legislatures and was passed by the UK Parliament without any of those legislatures’ consent. The United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 was passed without the consent of the Senedd or the Scottish Parliament.55 The Northen Ireland Assembly did not hold a formal legislative consent vote.

46.Providing evidence to this committee in July 2021, Mr Drakeford said that he could accept the UK Government’s rationale for enacting the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, as a major constitutional bill, without the consent of the devolved legislatures. However, he thought that the Government’s argument that this was “exceptional” was undermined by its subsequent decision to enact the UK Internal Market Act 2020 without the consent of the Senedd or the Scottish Parliament. He said this was “the single most damaging act to the Union in the whole 20-plus years of devolution”.56

47.In 2021 the Welsh Government sought judicial review of provisions of the UK Internal Market Act 2020 which impacted on the Senedd’s legislative competence.57 In February 2022, the Court of Appeal upheld an earlier High Court ruling that it was too soon for judicial review of the impact of the Internal Market Act 2020.58 The Supreme Court later rejected the Welsh Government’s application for permission to appeal.59

48.The Scottish Government has also been highly critical of the Internal Market Act 2020. In March 2021 it said:

“While the circumstances of EU exit are undoubtedly unprecedented, overriding the Sewel Convention was not justified, especially in the case of the UK Internal Market Act which was not necessary to implement an international treaty or to progress the process of EU exit. The effect is that the UK Government has shown it is willing to reshape the devolution settlement, unilaterally and in the most fundamental way, setting aside any rules of the UK constitutional system that it finds inconvenient.”60

COVID-19

49.When the COVID-19 pandemic began, the then Government chose not to make use of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to introduce new laws to tackle the pandemic. Nor were COVID-19 specific lockdown powers included in the Coronavirus Act 2020. Instead, in introducing the most significant legal changes in England, the Government relied on regulation-making powers in the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984.61

50.Many policy areas key to tackling the COVID-19 virus—such as health and education—are devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and emergency powers to deal with the spread of infection were different in the four nations of the UK. The Welsh Government, like the UK Government, made and amended its own COVID-19 restrictions using powers in the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984.62 The Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Executive had their own equivelant powers under Schedules 18 and 19 of the Coronavirus Act 2020,63 which supplemented the Public Health etc. (Scotland) Act 200864 and the Public Health Act (Northern Ireland) 196765 respectively.66

51. In our report COVID-19 and the use and scrutiny of emergency powers we noted that the Coronavirus Act 2020 was “the product of close intergovernmental collaboration and was passed with the consent of all three devolved legislatures … Officials from each of the devolved administrations worked together from mid-February to ensure the legislation was drafted to meet their needs.”67 We welcomed this, noting that:

“[w]hile the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 would have allowed the UK Government to adopt a more centralised response to COVID-19, Schedules 18 and 19 to the 2020 Act instead enabled the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive to determine their own response to the pandemic. This approach respected the devolution arrangements.”68

52.However, because the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive were responsible for introducing and lifting their own restrictions, different restrictions arose in different parts of the UK. For example, “travel corridors” were introduced in England days before the devolved administrations made equivalent announcements, which caused confusion for the public and gave rise to potential health risks.69

53.In COVID-19 and the use and scrutiny of emergency powers we reported that the JMC Plenary did not meet during the COVID-19 pandemic. Initially, meetings of the Civil Contingencies Committee (COBRA) and five new ministerial implementation groups (MIGs) took place, in which the devolved administrations were invited to participate. In our report we concluded:

“We welcome the collaborative approach adopted by the UK Government and the devolved administrations in the early stages of the pandemic. This period demonstrates that all parts of the UK are capable of working together effectively in a crisis, saving lives and sharing information.”70

54.However, this arrangement was short-lived. A political decision was taken by the then Government that from June 2020 two Cabinet Committees, to which the devolved administrations were not invited, would replace COBRA meetings and MIGs. In our report we expressed concern about this, stating that the “breakdown in intergovernmental cooperation and UK-wide coordination during this period contributed to a lack of clarity about what rules applied where … Divergence also exacerbated existing political tensions.”71

55.In Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for the 21st Century we said:

“It is unfortunate that greater progress on reforming intergovernmental structures was not achieved before the challenges of Brexit and COVID-19 demonstrated the inherent weaknesses in the current arrangements. Both challenges have underlined the pre-existing need to strengthen intergovernmental arrangements.”72

This inquiry

56.With the COVID-19 pandemic and the implementation of Brexit now largely behind us, this inquiry sought to understand whether the extraordinary strains placed on intergovernmental relations and the Sewel convention by those events persist, and whether the new intergovernmental relations structures put in place in January 2022 are sufficiently robust to withstand future stresses and strains as they arise.

57.We began our inquiry in February 2024. We would like to thank all those who assisted our work by providing oral or written evidence. We would have liked to have heard from the then Minister for Intergovernmental Relations, the Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, and an evidence session for this purpose was due to take place on 12 June 2024. However, on 22 May 2024—during the course of our inquiry—the former Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Rishi Sunak MP, called a general election, which took place on 4 July 2024. During the dissolution period ahead of the general election, all select committees ceased to exist and no formal committee business could take place. As such, we were unable to proceed with our planned evidence session.

58.With a new Labour Government in power, we now make recommendations that we hope will help guide the new Government to build and maintain a more effective Union, characterised by respect for and co-operation between the governments and legislatures of the devolved nations.

59.As a Committee, part of our remit is to keep under review constitutional aspects of devolution. As such, we intend to return to this matter and will seek to examine the efficacy of the intergovernmental relations arrangements and the operation of the Sewel Convention again in the near future. In addition to responding to our report within the normal two-month timeframe, we also ask that the new Government undertakes to review both the operation of intergovernmental relations and the Sewel convention over the coming year, with a view to implementing the recommendations in our report. We invite the Government to provide an update to the Committee on progress made by the end of September 2025.

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