The Governance of the Union: Consultation, Co-operation and Legislative consent Contents

Chapter 2: Are the new intergovernmental relations structures working?

The effectiveness of the new intergovernmental relations structures

60.Since 2021, the UK Government has published quarterly and annual reports on intergovernmental relations.73 The most recent annual report, published in April 2024, reports that a total of 210 intergovernmental ministerial meetings took place in 2023.74 This was a decrease from 227 intergovernmental ministerial meetings in 2022.75 Intergovernmental ministerial meetings in 2023 focussed on topics including: Economy and Funding, Energy and Net Zero, Environment, Health, Trade, Transport and Ukraine. These meetings were held by a range of UK Government departments, with the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and the Wales Office holding the most meetings.76

61.We asked witnesses to assess the new structures’ effectiveness in maintaining and improving relationships between the UK Government and the governments of the devolved nations. Several witnesses thought the new structures had the potential to improve relations.77 However, a number of issues were raised, including: the consistency of meetings, sufficient notice of meetings, cancellation of meetings, attendance by the relevant secretary of state and a lack of commitment to the Prime Minister and Heads of Devolved Governments Council.

62.Dr Philip Rycroft, Former Permanent Secretary at the Department for Exiting the European Union, thought the expectation that the Prime Minister should attend the Prime Minister and Heads of Devolved Governments Council was positive because it amounted to a “baking-in of prime ministerial involvement”. He also welcomed the introduction of a reinforced dispute resolution mechanism and an impartial secretariat. However, he thought the most critical thing was “the spirit that informs the use of these structures”. He asked:

“Are these Interministerial Groups actually meeting? Is the Prime Minister and Heads of Devolved Governments Council meeting? When they meet, are the discussions substantive? Do they seek to advance policy or is it just a bit of a show and tell?” He thought the jury was still out on these questions.”78

63.Other witnesses raised concerns about the variability of intergovernmental meetings and questioned whether they were capable of delivering consistently.79 The Senedd Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee said that formal structures had yet to be established for some policy areas, such as health and social care. The Committee noted Welsh ministers’ frustration at the lack of attendance by relevant Secretaries of State at Interministerial Group meetings. The regularity of meetings also varied, with, for example, the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Interministerial Group meeting five times in 2023, while the Business and Industry Interministerial Group met once.80

64.Rebecca Evans MS, the Welsh Government Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Constitution and Cabinet Office, described it as “telling” that the Prime Minister and Heads of Devolved Governments Council had only met once, in November 2022, at which point Northern Ireland did not have an Executive.81 This concern was shared by other witnesses.82

65.In Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for the 21st Century we said:

“We believe the Prime Minister has a critical role to play in making the new intergovernmental structures a success and maintaining strong relationships between the four administrations. Given its importance to the working of the Union, we recommend the Prime Minister and Heads of Devolved Governments Council should meet at least twice each year.”83

66.Ms Evans described the meetings of the Interministerial Standing Committee as “sporadic at best”: “The intention to have a regular, reliable rhythm of meetings has certainly not yet been fulfilled”. She added that the expectation that the Interministerial Groups would be used for “mutual discussions at portfolio level had not been fulfilled.84 She also said that meetings were often cancelled at late notice, which “speaks to the level of priority that is given to those meetings”. For the intergovernmental structures to work she said: “we need all parties to be energised about them and for all parties to recognise the benefit they can bring to citizens”.85 She noted that the Finance: Interministerial Standing Committee had been more successful, though challenges had arisen as a result of the high churn of ministers involved.86

67.Dr Lisa Claire Whitten, Research Fellow, School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics at Queen’s University Belfast, said she had noted some frustration from the Scottish and Welsh governments “at perhaps a lack of substantive discussions within the meetings”. With reference to specific Interministerial Groups, she also noted frustration “about the speed of the meetings being organised and perhaps a lack of communication in advance”. However, she thought this had changed over time: “There may have been a bedding down of the system and arrangements, such that there is more advanced notice of meetings. The rotating chair system has started to take effect and seems to be working quite well.”87

68.Research conducted by Dr Elin Royles, Reader at the Centre for Welsh Politics and Society at the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Dr Carolyn Rowe, Reader at the Aston Centre for Europe, Aston University and Dr Rachel Minto, Senior Lecturer at the Wales Governance Centre, Cardiff University, suggested that between February 2022 and September 2023 the UK-EU Interministerial Group was not used effectively to consult the devolved administrations:

“Examples include UK-EU Interministerial Group (IMG) being postponed, or meetings being held at very short notice (sometimes a few hours), making it difficult for devolved government ministers to attend. Furthermore, the meetings were not always well planned in advance with little opportunity for the devolved governments to inform the agenda. When they were held, they tended to be organised very close to key UK-EU meetings, thus providing limited opportunities for effective consultation or providing devolved governments with an opportunity to input into the UK’s position in those discussions. Instead, they seemed to have operated largely as an information sharing exercise on the part of the UK Government.”88

69.However, the same research suggested that since September 2023 the UK-EU Interministerial Group had been used more effectively to “consult devolved government and promote collaboration and the avoidance of disagreements”. Interviewees reported that:

“from the 11 September 2023 meeting, communication regarding the practical details of the meeting beforehand has been more effective, including with greater prior discussion of the agenda between the different governments. In addition, the more forward-looking content of the discussion focused on forthcoming UK-EU meetings provided greater opportunity for devolved governments to share their points of view for those discussions and an exploration of different positions prior to the meetings taking place.”89

70.In written evidence, DLUHC said that the new intergovernmental relations arrangements “provide a system through which all governments can collaboratively address shared challenges”. DLUHC said: “While there will not always be consensus, the structures provide a framework for effective engagement across administrations.”90

71.DLUHC cited energy and household support schemes across the UK, green freeports in Scotland and updates for the devolved administrations on the situation in Israel and Gaza as examples of successful use of the new intergovernmental relations structures.91 Professor Laura McAllister, Professor of Public Policy and the Governance of Wales at the University of Cardiff and Co-chair at the Independent Commission on the Constitutional Future of Wales, also spoke positively about liaison on freeports policy. The Revd and Rt Hon Dr Rowan Williams, Co-chair of the Independent Commission on the Constitutional Future of Wales, cited positive collaboration between the Home Office and Police and Crime Commissioners in Wales.92

72.The Rt Hon David TC Davies MP, former Secretary of State for Wales, told us that in addition to formal engagement with the Welsh Government through the intergovernmental relations structures, he also met ministers on “a day-to-day basis”. Mr Davies said that conversations with Welsh ministers—both formal and informal—had a positive impact on work undertaken to support the community of Port Talbot following the planned closure of Tata Steel.93 This was echoed by the Rt Hon Alister Jack MP, the then Secretary of State for Scotland, who said that in addition to formal, diarised meetings with Scottish Ministers, conversations took place as need arose “whether in person, on Zoom or on the telephone”, with the civil service present. Mr Jack said this had worked well, citing as an example a seafood task force that operated from the Scotland Office following Brexit.94

73.As discussed in Chapter 1, the new intergovernmental relations structures are, on paper, a welcome initiative. They have the potential to remedy criticisms levelled at the previous intergovernmental structures by creating a more regular, transparent and formal system of intergovernmental working. However, the realisation of their full potential, as genuine vehicles for collaboration and co-operation, will require the new Government to fully embed them into the day-to-day business of government. The devolved administrations must also demonstrate commitment to engaging with the new structures.

74.We recommend that intergovernmental meetings are scheduled consistently, at intervals deemed appropriate by both the UK Government and the devolved governments. Other than in exceptional circumstances, devolved governments should be given sufficient notice of meetings, allowing them the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the development of meeting agendas. Where appropriate, meetings should be attended by the relevant Secretary of State and the cancellation of meetings at late notice should be avoided.

75.We welcome the manifesto commitment made by the new Government to “renew opportunities for the Prime Minister and Heads of Devolved Government to collaborate with each other”95 and reiterate our previous recommendation that the Prime Minister and Heads of Devolved Governments Council should meet on a regular basis, and at least twice annually.

76.As set out in paragraph 186, the effectiveness of the intergovernmental relations structures under the new government will be helped by the recent appointment of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster as Minister for Intergovernmental Relations, with responsibility for devolution, and the location of this post in the Cabinet Office.

Scrutiny of intergovernmental relations

77.As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the principles underpinning the new intergovernmental relations structures is a commitment by all four governments to “[promote] understanding of, and accountability for … intergovernmental activity”,96 including through “enhanced reporting to their respective legislatures.”97

78.In written evidence the Senedd Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee spoke of the challenges for the Committee and the Senedd more broadly in scrutinising the Welsh Government’s intergovernmental activity:

“The information being provided to legislatures after meetings is inconsistent in terms of quality and timeliness. Communiqués from meetings can sometimes take months to be published, and the detail of discussion points varies significantly. For example, the UK Government’s central communiqués and Welsh Government statements following meetings of the Net Zero, Energy and Climate Change IMG have been very brief, whilst those of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs IMG have been more detailed. The Welsh Government publishes periodic reports on [intergovernmental relations], in line with an Inter-Institutional Relations Agreement with the Senedd. The UK Government also publishes quarterly and annual reports on IGR, however, these can often be too focused on the UK Government’s perspective and can sometimes conflate formal and informal intergovernmental meetings.”98

79.In its report How Devolution is Changing Post-EU, the Scottish Parliament’s Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture (CEEAC) Committee discussed the increased importance of scrutinising the Scottish Government’s intergovernmental activity since the UK’s departure from the EU:

“[T]he increased significance of intergovernmental relations within a shared governance space raises substantial challenges for parliamentary scrutiny … the management of the regulatory environment across the UK is now dependent on effective intergovernmental relations which could involve a significant increase in UK-wide legislation in devolved areas. There is, therefore, a significant risk that laws made at a UK level in devolved areas will lessen the accountability of the Scottish Ministers to the Scottish Parliament and lessen the opportunities for the public and stakeholders to engage at a devolved level. In turn this requires the Scottish Parliament to review how it approaches the scrutiny of intergovernmental relations and scrutiny of the Scottish Ministers in their shared role in the governance of the UK alongside the UK Government and other devolved governments.”99

80.In written evidence, the Northern Ireland Executive Office said that no formal arrangements had been put in place with regard to informing the Northern Ireland Assembly of matters related to intergovernmental relations. However, it said: “Ministers will be responsive to any requests for information and the benefits of statements to the Assembly following significant developments or significant decisions at meetings, will be considered as appropriate.”100

81.While we welcome the commitment by the governments of the United Kingdom to promote understanding of, and accountability for, intergovernmental activity through enhanced reporting to their respective legislatures, we are concerned by reports that information on intergovernmental activity is sometimes lacking. To fulfil their pledge to improve transparency and accountability, all four governments should ensure reporting on intergovernmental activity is timely and includes sufficient detail to facilitate effective scrutiny by their respective legislatures.

Goodwill, attitudes and culture

82.Goodwill, and a constructive attitude and culture among the governments of the UK, were identified by witnesses as key to ensuring that the new intergovernmental relations mechanisms were effective.

83.Several witnesses thought that the greater responsibility for making intergovernmental relations work rested with the UK Government.101 Professor Gallagher commented that: “Intergovernmental relations are front of mind for the devolved Administrations but are back of the house for the UK central government and can be perceived as a nuisance.”102 Dr Rycroft noted that the UK Government was a larger administration and also held more knowledge than the devolved administrations:

“If you do not know what Whitehall is thinking about, you do not know what questions to ask. You cannot go on a constant fishing expedition to say, ‘Are you thinking of doing some more immigration legislation?’ or something else. Whitehall, as you know, can hold this stuff very tight … So the burden of proof, in a way, rests more with Whitehall than with the devolved Governments.”103

84.Dr Anderson and Dr Brown Swan commented that the effective suspension of ministerial intergovernmental relations due to “political turmoil within the UK Government in 2022” served to emphasise the important role of the UK Government in facilitating effective intergovernmental relations. They thought that the success of intergovernmental relations relied on “the willingness of those involved to make arrangements work”. While reforming structures could help, a constructive shift in attitude and political culture was also required.104

85.Research conducted by Dr Royles, Dr Rowe and Dr Minto suggested that “party political tensions between different governments in the UK” combined with the “UK Government’s attitude towards devolution” had an impact on the operation of the new intergovernmental relations structures.105

86.Other witnesses recognised the political tensions that arose between different political parties in power in different parts of the UK but did not consider that this should be a barrier to effective intergovernmental working. Ms Evans said that even where individuals took “radically different views” there should be efforts made to find common ground through respectful discussions.106 Professor McAllister considered it important to concentrate on the framework for relationships between the governments of the UK. She said: “[W]e need to drill down into what would make good relationships function, regardless of which parties are in power”.107

87.Mr Davies said it “was no secret that there are tensions at times” between the UK Government and the Welsh Government, due to the fact that there was (at the time he was providing evidence) a Conservative Government in Westminster and a Labour Government in Wales. However, there was a lot of collaborative working on issues in which the two governments were in agreement, including “the importance of encouraging investment, jobs, the growth deals and the work that is going on around Tata [Steel]”108. In terms of building positive relationships, Mr Davies added that he had made it very clear to the UK Government that it was important to “show a positive attitude towards working with the Welsh Government” when it came to setting up a transition board to support the Port Talbot community. He suggested that a Welsh minister should sit on the board as deputy chair, which was implemented.109

88.Mr Jack said that while there had been tensions between the UK Government, who were supportive of devolution, and the SNP-led Scottish Government who, in his view, “oppose devolution”, that friction was not evidence of devolution failing: “In fact, the evidence shows that the devolution settlement has proved sufficiently flexible to accommodate fundamental political differences.”110

89.Ms Evans spoke about the importance of early sharing of information: “[G]ood will is about trust, sharing information early and understanding that that information is shared with confidence.” She said: “The UK Government’s engagement, the extent of the information shared with us and the timeliness of that sharing is inconsistent and too variable at the moment. When it works well, it shows that we can make good progress.”111

90.By way of example, Ms Evans spoke about the UK Government’s approach to tax changes:

“Stamp duty land tax is frequently changed at a UK Government Budget, but it directly impacts the Welsh Government because it affects our block grant. As such, literally as soon as the Chancellor makes an announcement on stamp duty land tax, we are asked, “What does that mean for Wales? Will my tax change? Should I complete a purchase now or should I wait?” All those questions come through and we have no notice whatsoever. Also, it impacts on the block grant adjustment, so the UK Government’s decisions have budgetary implications for us. A bit of earlier notice of the UK Government’s thinking, absolutely confidentially, would help us to respond by understanding how we could spend that additional money, how we could respond to a Budget cut, or how we might change our own land transaction tax.”

She said the Welsh Government had tried to show goodwill in the other direction by sharing early information on its own tax policy, even though Welsh taxes do not have the same implications for the UK Government.112

91.Ms Evans continued: “The only real information we get ahead of a fiscal event is a call with the Chief Secretary to the Treasury on the morning of that event. We get the RDEL and CDEL numbers,113 the changes to our budget and literally nothing else … Respectful sharing of information would make such a big difference to us.”114

92.The UK Government is more powerful than the devolved governments and, by its nature as the government for the entire UK, possesses information about policy choices that may impact on the devolved nations. As such, while successful devolution requires goodwill on the part of every government, it is particularly incumbent upon the UK Government to take account of the impact its decisions may have throughout the UK and therefore to demonstrate goodwill in its interaction with the devolved governments and share information in good faith. Devolution also requires goodwill, constructive engagement and sharing of information by devolved governments, but where they are themselves hostile to the Union such goodwill and cooperation can be lacking.

93.Where different political parties are in power in different parts of the United Kingdom, underlying political differences are inevitable and unavoidable. If intergovernmental relations are to be effective and sustainable, then it is essential that all parties foster a culture of positive engagement; politicians throughout the United Kingdom, whatever their view of the current constitutional structures, must be prepared to overcome political differences in the interests of the people they serve.

The dispute resolution process

94.In written evidence, DLUHC told us that the dispute resolution process had been engaged only once to date. This was with regard to a dispute between the UK Government and the Northern Ireland Executive about a scheme for the payment of pensions to persons permanently disabled as a result of Troubles-related incidents.115 The dispute process was paused following the Northern Ireland Executive’s collapse in February 2022.116 In written evidence, the Northern Ireland Executive Office informed us that “[t]he relevant NI Minister is now considering whether to re-commence the process”.117

95.We have set out the dispute resolution escalation process in Box 1 below. In written evidence DLUHC made clear that the intergovernmental relations system and structures “are designed to promote dispute avoidance and seek resolution at the lowest possible level.”118

Box 1: The dispute resolution escalation process

Stage 1: Any of the four governments has the right to raise a dispute that cannot be resolved at the relevant IMG or the F:ISC. These are to be assessed by the Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat against a jointly agreed list of criteria to determine whether they should be classified as a dispute and escalated. The criteria are:

(a)Has the disagreement been discussed extensively at senior civil servant level for the relevant portfolio or finance matter?

(b)Was a solution proposed at the senior civil servants’ discussion (that was not satisfactory to all parties to the disagreement)?

(c) Has the disagreement been discussed extensively by the relevant portfolio or Finance Ministers?

(d)Does the disagreement have implications beyond its policy area, impacting the wider relationships between the parties involved?

If the Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat is satisfied that a dispute meets all the agreed criteria, it will be escalated to the IMSC or the F:ISC, as appropriate. If the dispute does not meet the criteria, the Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat will refer it back for consideration at an earlier stage in the process.

Ahead of the IMSC or the F:ISC, the relevant secretariat will coordinate a meeting of the Senior Officials’ Group within 10 working days (unless all parties agree to an extension). The Senior Officials’ Group will consider collective recommendations to ministers for resolution. The Chair must not be a representative of a government which is party to the dispute and does not have a decision-making role.

Stage 2: Following the meeting of the Senior Officials’ Group, the relevant Secretariat will convene a meeting of the relevant ministers within 10 working days (unless an extension is agreed). The relevant ministers and officials will receive an agenda from the Secretariat summarising background information and the recommendations of the Senior Officials’ Group. The Chair of the meeting will be a minister from a government not party to the dispute or an independent third party, and will not have a decision-making role.

If resolution to the dispute is not reached at the IMSC or the F:ISC, it will be escalated to the Prime Minister and Heads of Devolved Governments Council (the Council), unless all parties agree not to escalate and instead to report to legislatures on the outcome of the dispute.

Impartial (non-binding) advice or mediation should be sought from a third party at the F:ISC or ahead of escalation to the Council, unless all parties to the dispute agree not to do so. Alternative means of resolution can also be sought should all parties agree.

No disagreement over the operating arrangements can prevent escalation to the Council, and it is for the relevant Secretariat to determine escalation.

Stage 3: The Council will consider the dispute and third-party advice within a month. For all disputes, the Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat will produce a paper for the Council.

The Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat will report on the outcome of the dispute at the final escalation stage, including any third-party advice obtained. This report must be laid by each government before its legislature.

If governments reach a stage in the process where they are unable to reach a resolution and progress the dispute further, each government must make a statement to its respective legislature setting out the circumstances for the failure to reach a solution.

Source: Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, ‘The Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat: function and role’ (27 November 2023): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-intergovernmental-relations-secretariat/the-intergovernmental-relations-secretariat-function-and-role [accessed 23 September 2024]; Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, The Review of Intergovernmental Relations (13 January 2022): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61df0068e90e07037ba76b4c/The_Review_of_Intergovernmental_Relations.pdf [accessed 23 September 2024]; written evidence from the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (GOU0006)

96.The below graphic, included in ‘The Review of Intergovernmental Relations’ policy document, illustrates how the dispute resolution process works:

Figure 2: Flowchart of dispute resolution process

Flowchart showing the dispute resolution process between UK and devolved governments

Source: Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, The Review of Intergovernmental Relations (13 January 2022): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61df0068e90e07037ba76b4c/The_Review_of_Intergovernmental_Relations.pdf [accessed 23 September 2024]

97.In written evidence, DLUHC told us:

“The Secretariat is also committed to publishing an annual report including any resolved disputes, an executive summary of the Secretariat report on the outcome and associated third-party reports when relevant and appropriate.”119

98.Witnesses were generally positive about the existence of the dispute resolution process but several pointed to potential limitations, especially when it came to particularly contentious or political issues.

99.Dr Rycroft thought the existence of the dispute resolution process was “an advance” because the UK Government could not now deny the existence of a dispute. If one party said there was a dispute, then it had to go through the system. However, he noted that parties may be reluctant to use the process if they did not think the issue would be usefully considered.120

100.Professor Jim Gallagher, Visiting Professor at the School of Law, University of Glasgow, described the design of the dispute resolution process as “not bad”. He said “The question is: will the people involved, including the potential mediators or independent people, be of sufficient weight to be able to bring the politicians to the table and get them to do a deal? I think experiment will determine the answer to that question.”121

101.Professor Ciaran Martin, Professor of Practice in the Management of Public Organisations at Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, questioned the extent to which a formal mechanism such as the dispute resolution process can be expected to “cut it” given the intensity of some of the disagreements at play. He had sympathy with the argument that politics had to be given space to take its course and did not think you could “overly systematise” the resolution of major political disputes.122

102.Dr Rycroft pointed to two examples of occasions on which both the UK Government and the Scottish Government saw political opportunity in having disputes in public, rather than using the formal dispute resolution mechanism: the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill and the deposit return scheme.123

103.In December 2022 the Scottish Parliament passed the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill, which, if enacted, would have introduced a separate process in Scotland for obtaining a Gender Recognition Certificate under the UK-wide Gender Recognition Act 2004.124 Gender recognition is a devolved matter in Scotland. However, the Secretary of State for Scotland issued a ‘section 35 order’, which blocked the Bill from proceeding to Royal Assent. Section 35 of the Scotland Act 1998 allows the Secretary of State to prohibit the Presiding Officer from submitting a bill for Royal Assent even if the bill is within devolved competence, if the Secretary of State reasonably believes the bill is incompatible with international obligations, national security or defence interests or where the legislation would have “an adverse effect” on reserved matters.125

104.The Scottish Government sought a judicial review, challenging the validity of the section 35 Order, at the Outer House of the Court of Session in April 2023. The Scottish Government argued that the Gender Recognition Reform Bill did not modify the law as it applies to reserved matters, and that the UK Government improperly used section 35 to block the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill because it disagreed with the policy behind the Bill. It also argued that the UK Government did not act in accordance with agreed processes for intergovernmental consultation, and that these channels should have been pursued before the section 35 order was issued. The UK Government responded by arguing that the Bill would have an adverse effect on reserved matters, in particular by affecting the reserved matter of ‘equal opportunities’—specifically the Equality Act 2010, which makes ‘sex’ a protected characteristic.126 Dealing with the issue of intergovernmental consultation, the Court found that “the Memorandum of Understanding is a political agreement and compliance or otherwise therewith is not justiciable”,127 relying upon R (Miller) v Secretary of State.128

105.The Court therefore found in favour of the UK Government, concluding that there was a rational basis for the Section 35 Order and that the Scottish Government had not shown it to be unreasonable in law. The Court rejected the Lord Advocate’s submission that policy disagreement regarding gender reform lay behind the Secretary of State’s decision to make the Order. As such, the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill could not be submitted for Royal Assent.129 The Scottish Government has since said it would not appeal the decision.130

106.In a different example, in August 2023, the Scottish Government expected to introduce a deposit return scheme (whereby a deposit of 20p would have been added to the price of single-use drinks containers which would have been refunded if the item was returned for recycling). However, because the deposit return scheme would have introduced trading requirements in Scotland different to those in the rest of the UK, it contravened the rules in the Internal Market Act 2020 preventing regulations that discriminate between goods originating from different parts of the UK. While the UK Government did grant an exemption to the Internal Market Act 2020 which would have allowed the Scottish deposit return scheme to proceed, it would not extend this to cover glass on the basis that planned schemes elsewhere in the UK were not intending to include glass, and because of the added cost and complexity for the businesses involved in the scheme.131

107.In response, then First Minister of Scotland, Humza Yousaf, wrote to the then Prime Minister outlining his concerns about the UK Government’s refusal to include glass in the Internal Market Act 2020 exemption. Mr Yousaf said the exclusion of glass would have “a stark environmental impact and detrimentally impact businesses based in Scotland” and “fundamentally threatens the viability of Scotland’s [deposit return scheme] with reduced revenue for the scheme administrator.”132 On 5 June 2023 the UK Government said it would not reconsider the conditions attached to the Internal Market Act 2020 exclusion. On 7 June 2023 the Scottish Government published a statement announcing that the Scottish deposit return scheme would be delayed until at least October 2025 “as a consequence of the UK Government’s refusal to agree a full exclusion from the Internal Market Act”.133

108.Discussing these examples, Dr Rycroft said:

“[Y]ou have there two very good examples of where there was clearly a cross-border impact … a common interest in dealing with the underlying issues, whatever route you choose to take, and where, for whatever reason, those issues were taken not into a “Let us see if we can sort this out” domain but into a “Let us have a fight about it” domain … I saw in that both Governments, the Scottish Government and the UK Government, seeing political opportunity in having that argument. That, of course, would militate against putting it into a formal dispute resolution mechanism, because they wanted to have that argument in the public space and thereby lost sight of the underlying objectives of what they were trying to achieve.”134

109.In written evidence Dr Paul Anderson, Senior Lecturer in Politics at Liverpool John Moores University, and Dr Coree Brown Swan, Lecturer in British Politics at University of Stirling, described these incidents as “a missed opportunity to have used the [intergovernmental relations] machinery to address both UK and Scottish government concerns and priorities.” 135

110.More recently, however, Shona Robison, the former Scottish Deputy First Minister, said that a disagreement between the UK and Scottish governments about the banning of sales of glue traps for rodents would be raised in Interministerial Standing Committee and Interministerial Group structures.136

111.Ms Evans told us that the Welsh Government had not yet taken forward a dispute due to the impetus to resolve disputes “through discussion and collaboration”. Nonetheless, if that proved ineffective, the Welsh Government would use the dispute mechanism. She thought it more likely that it would be used on constitutional or finance matters, rather than for more minor issues.137

112.The Senedd Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee noted that, “[d]espite several disagreements relating to legislative consent, the Welsh Government has yet to trigger the new dispute resolution process.” The Committee recalled that the Welsh Counsel General had told them that the timetable associated with UK bills passing through parliament meant it would be difficult for the Welsh Government to use the dispute resolution process in relation to individual UK bills. The Counsel General said:

“It can sometimes be very late in a Bill’s passage before it becomes clear that agreement at intergovernmental level cannot be reached, and whilst the dispute processes can run quickly, they do not override Parliament’s ability to pursue and timetable legislative business.”

The Committee questioned how valuable the dispute resolution process was if the legislative timeline did not allow time for it to be used.138

113.The dispute resolution process, as a feature of the new intergovernmental relations process, has not yet been tested. As referenced in paragraph 94, it has been initiated only once—in a dispute between the Northern Ireland Executive and the UK Government that was paused following the collapse of the Northern Ireland institutions in February 2022. It is therefore not possible, at this time, to assess the efficacy of the new dispute resolution process.

114.Nevertheless, in many circumstances, engagement with the dispute resolution process is unlikely to be the most practical course of action. There are three particular reasons for this. Often, informal dialogue between governments will be more effective. Where legislation is involved, the speed and process by which bills and substantive amendments make their way through the legislatures may make it impracticable to pursue a complaint through the dispute resolution process. The reality of different political parties holding power in different parts of the UK—some of which support the Union and others of which aspire to independence—is that publicity engendered by high-profile public disputes will at times be more appealing than resolving issues through established governance structures. For all these reasons it may be that use of the dispute resolution process will remain limited. We will keep this under review.

The role of the civil service

115.In our 2015 report Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom we discussed civil servants’ knowledge and experience of devolution. We said: “It is already the case that a lack of experience of the devolved administrations is affecting inter-governmental relations in the UK. This problem will only grow as further powers are devolved. Over time, the level and breadth of engagement between government departments and the devolved administrations will continue to expand.”139

116.In our current inquiry, several witnesses again emphasised the important role for civil servants in ensuring that intergovernmental relations structures were effective.140 Professor Gallagher said it was important that the ministerial structures and meetings that formed the new intergovernmental relations structures were shadowed by a set of official structures and meetings, which encouraged officials to work together. In his view, relationships between officials had become more distant since devolution.141

117.There was, however, concern among witnesses as to the level of knowledge held by Whitehall civil servants about devolution. Dr Rycroft said officials in Whitehall were not confident in understanding devolved politics, which made them “wary of engaging” with the devolved administrations.142 He told us that all departments were expected to have arrangements in place for dealing with devolution: “devolution teams, Ministers responsible for it, even these days one of the non-execs on the departmental boards with an overview of devolution.” When he worked in Government, departments were required to have devolution plans. However, as with intergovernmental relations structures, the requirements alone were insufficient unless there was a spirit of willingness to engage on devolution issues.143

118.The Senedd Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee told us:

“While there may have been improvements in individual Whitehall departments, collectively we do not believe that there has been enough progress overall to improve the knowledge and understanding of devolution across Whitehall, and both aspects remain inconsistent.”144

119.Dr Andrew Goodall, Permanent Secretary to the Welsh Government, said if the intergovernmental relations structures were to be discharged effectively, it was important that the civil service had “a good understanding of the devolution settlement.” He said that knowledge varied across different departments. He had spent significant time in his role describing to civil servants the responsibilities of the Welsh Government, using training and awareness programmes and platforms such as Civil Service Live.145

120.Dr Anderson and Dr Brown Swan said a lack of knowledge in Whitehall about how devolution works “resulted in the preponderance of a unitary and hierarchical mindset which colours the thinking of ministers and civil servants in Whitehall and consequently impedes more effective [intergovernmental relations]”.146 Dr Williams spoke about “routine incompetence” among Whitehall departments when it came to literacy about the constitutional structures that exist in the UK and the nature of devolved powers. He was in favour of long-term secondments among civil servants as a means of at least partially remedying this situation.147

121.In Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom we recommended that:

“[T]he Government sets out a strategy for ensuring that senior civil servants have either experience of, or training in, working with devolved administrations. Any work to improve exchanges of officials should include the Northern Ireland Civil Service, as well as taking place within the Home Civil Service that supports the UK, Welsh and Scottish Governments.”148

And:

“It is important that effective training on dealing with devolved administrations is available for civil servants. The National School of Government ran courses for officials on ‘Devolution in action’ and ‘Working with devolved administrations’, but closed in 2012. We would welcome clarification from the Government as to how this training is now provided.”149

122.Following our report, the Government introduced the Civil Service Devolution Capability Programme. DLUHC told us about this Programme in written evidence to our current inquiry:

“This is an ambitious programme that has been in place since 2015 to enhance devolution knowledge and intergovernmental working skills of civil servants, enabling them to deliver more effectively when designing and implementing policies. In financial year 2023/24 the programme reached 22,233 civil servants across Government, who attended centrally run devolution training. Taken together, they enable civil servants to work across the UK Government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive. There is always scope to improve engagement and understanding of these processes and it is something the UK Government works to improve … “150

123.Mr Davies, then Secretary of State for Wales, told us that although he had encountered ignorance amongst civil servants about devolution, he had never encountered hostility. In terms of ignorance, things had improved significantly over the four years he had been a minister.151 Mr Jack, then Secretary of State for Scotland, said officials in the Scotland Office had meetings with other civil servants across Whitehall departments “day in, day out … to make sure that upcoming legislation is carefully checked … that we do not make mistakes and that Whitehall departments understand the devolution settlement.”152 He also said there were now “policies coming into place to move civil servants around more” and “to have more shadowing”.153

124.Dr Royles, Dr Rowe and Dr Minto’s research also identified efforts being made to “develop positive official working relations” and found that “value was placed on proactive, close working at these levels”.154 In Dr Goodall’s assessment, the officials involved in intergovernmental relations were “effective”.155

125.In Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for the 21st Century we welcomed a commitment from Rt Hon Michael Gove to include devolution and intergovernmental working in civil servants’ training at all grades:156

“We welcome the Government’s commitment to increasing civil servants’ knowledge of the devolution arrangements through training programmes. To have the desired impact on changing Whitehall’s mindset this will require significant take up from the most junior to the most senior civil servants.”157

126.If intergovernmental relations are to be a success, it is vital that civil servants have a comprehensive understanding of devolution and are encouraged, including by ministers, to engage effectively with their counterparts in the devolved administrations where policy proposals are likely to impact upon devolved competence. We urge the new Government to ensure that every department has a properly equipped team—and a Ministerial lead—with the knowledge and skills necessary to address, anticipate and engage with devolution matters as they arise, providing an identified point of contact for the devolved administrations.

127.We note that the Civil Service Devolution Capability Programme has been in place since 2015 yet concerns remain about civil servants’ knowledge of devolution. We reiterate our previous recommendation that to be effective, such training requires significant take up, from the most junior to the most senior civil servants.

The restoration of Northern Ireland institutions

128.The new intergovernmental relations structures were introduced in January 2022—just before the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland collapsed on 3 February 2022. The Northern Ireland Executive Office told us that in the absence of a First Minister and Deputy First Minister it was officials who “engaged with their equivalent colleagues in the other governments on operational matters related to the functioning of the new machinery for Inter-Governmental Relations (IGR).”158

129.The Northern Ireland institutions were re-established on 3 February 2024 following an agreement between the UK Government and the Democratic Unionist Party, in which the latter agreed to endorse a package of measures which the Government set out in the Safeguarding the Union Command Paper.159

130.At the time at which DLUHC submitted written evidence (in April 2024), Northern Ireland Executive ministers had, since the restoration of the Executive, attended the sixth Interministerial Standing Committee, the Interministerial Group on UK-EU Relations and the Finance: Interministerial Standing Committee, all held in March 2024. The first East-West Council, established as part of the Safeguarding the Union Command Paper, took place on 26 March 2024. The Council’s focus is on trade promotion, connectivity, culture and skills.160

131.Lord Caine, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office, told us that with the restoration of the Northern Ireland Executive, he hoped to “build a much more structured relationship than we have had over the past few years”.161

132.Lord Caine said he had “lost count” of the number of times he had attended the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee and said: “In normal circumstances, this would require a [legislative consent motion] process, but as there is no Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly, we can’t engage that process”. He said that during that period the UK Government did, however, consult with the Northern Ireland Civil Service. After the Executive and Assembly had been restored, the legislative consent process was functioning again.162 Speaking on 15 May 2024, before Parliament was dissolved for the General Election, Lord Caine said: “There are currently three LCM memorandums being considered by the Assembly in relation to the Pet Abduction Bill, the Tobacco and Vapes Bill, and of course the Post Office (Horizon System) Offences Bill. One LCM has already been secured for the Pensions (Special Rules for End of Life) Bill.”163

133.Professor Gallagher thought the restoration of the Northern Ireland institutions, and the presence of three rather than two devolved administrations, had the potential to widen the scope of intergovernmental relations. He said: “It turns into more of a territorial constitutional body for the whole United Kingdom. I hope that it will make it fuller.”164

134.Dr Whitten identified some areas where the participation of Northern Ireland ministers in the intergovernmental relations structures might expand the discussion to include new dimensions. For example, the Interministerial Group for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs might have to consider Northern Ireland’s obligations under the Windsor Framework and, therefore, EU policy decisions in relevant areas. In addition, the Interministerial Group for Net Zero, Energy and Climate Change might have to consider that there is a single electricity market in Northern Ireland and Ireland, which links Northern Ireland, to a degree, to EU policy decisions in this area.165

135.However, Dr Whitten also said she did not necessarily think it was realistic to expect Northern Ireland to play a very direct role in shaping the direction of the intergovernmental relations structures. This was partly due to “the challenge in many contexts of articulating a strong, unified Northern Ireland position on some of the substantive policy areas.”166

136.In written evidence, the Northern Ireland Assembly’s Committee for the Executive Office said consideration should be given to how the new bodies created under the Safeguarding the Union command paper complement the intergovernmental arrangements, and the effects of the intergovernmental relations arrangements on the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement.167

137.It is not yet clear how the re-establishment of Northern Ireland institutions in February 2024 will impact on the efficacy of the new intergovernmental relations structures. As such, a full assessment of the intergovernmental relations structures will require time to allow for Northern Ireland’s full participation to bed in.

Common frameworks

138.When the UK left the European Union, powers previously exercised by the EU were returned to the UK, many of which fell within the competence of the devolved administrations. Common frameworks were developed as a means to ensure a common approach was taken on relevant policy areas.168 Common frameworks are being developed in 32 policy areas.169 In its final report, the Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee explained the role of common frameworks:

“While they vary greatly, they all create the processes necessary for day-to-day cooperation across the UK between its four constituent parts. They can be used to agree public messaging and research collaboration, as within the Public Health Protection and Public Health Security framework. Or they can be used to develop single processes that are essential for the functioning of the UK internal market, such as for the authorisation of nutrition and health claims, as within the Nutrition Related Labelling, Composition and Standards framework. They also allow for policy divergence where the relevant administrations agree to disagree.”170

139.In written evidence, DLUHC provided an explanation of the common frameworks programme:

“The Common Frameworks programme is grounded in the jointly-agreed Common Frameworks principles. The centrepiece of the principles is agreement to establish common approaches in certain areas where there is returning EU law in devolved competence. These common approaches consist of highly structured joint governance set out in a Framework Outline Agreement and often a concordat. In order to both deliver collaboration and manage disagreements, the Common Frameworks adhere to a standard format which requires the setting-out of the structures which provide for joint discussion, decision-making, and information sharing. Many Frameworks include a ‘no surprises’ clause which requires timely sharing of information. Each Framework also includes a dispute avoidance and resolution mechanism which is guided by the principle of subsidiarity and which aims to resolve disagreements before they can turn into [Intergovernmental relations]-level disputes. In practice a number of disagreements have been resolved through a Common Framework before they become an intergovernmental dispute.”171

140.Witnesses were generally positive about the common frameworks programme. Dr Rycroft thought common frameworks were a good example of “daily cross-border working” that takes places behind the high-profile public disputes between the governments of the UK. He said: “As far as I can see, they are working, out of sight of the political stramash … I think they are a very important part of the mix now, and very necessary to handle the post-Brexit dispensation.”172

141.Dr Anderson and Dr Brown Swan noted that common frameworks were “generally considered to be a good model to facilitate joint-working between the UK and devolved governments”. They thought this was partly because common frameworks were perceived by devolved ministers as being “mutually negotiated and agreed between governments, rather than imposed by the UK Government.”173

142.This view appears to be shared by the Scottish Government, who, in evidence to the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee, said:

“The Common Frameworks programme shows that there is an entirely practicable way for the governments to manage policy divergence in devolved matters on the basis of agreement. Indeed, Common Frameworks are an example of new intergovernmental mechanisms which could help embed better ways of working between the four governments, as they are underpinned by principles including respect for devolution, observing the Sewel Convention and acknowledging the legitimacy of policy divergence.”174

143.The Scottish Parliament’s CEEAC Committee noted there was consensus among the UK Government and the devolved governments that common frameworks “provide the right mechanism to manage regulatory divergence within the UK internal market”.175 The Senedd Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee described common frameworks as a “key mechanism for the development and coordination of policy and legislation across governments in the UK post-Brexit.”176

144.In its March 2021 report Common frameworks: building a cooperative Union the House of Lords Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee concluded:

“Common frameworks are innovative mechanisms for developing UK-wide policy by collaboration and consensus between the four administrations, taking account of the interests of each part of the UK. They strengthen the Union by acknowledging the interdependence of policy between administrations, while recognising the autonomy of each administration in its areas of competence through the possibility of divergence on the basis of consent.”177

And:

“Common frameworks represent an example of best practice for positive cooperation across the UK and have an important role to play in an evolving devolution settlement and in strengthening the Union.”178

145.However, the Committee expressed concern that common frameworks were at risk of becoming “a missed opportunity”.179 This was in part due to concerns about the common frameworks programme having become process driven, rather than a vehicle for policy development or policy coordination, as originally intended,180 and concern about ministerial oversight having been moved from the Cabinet Office to DLUHC.181

146.The Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee also commented on the absence of finalised common frameworks, stating that:

“[This] is evidence that the Government has continually underestimated the effort, collaboration, and coordination required to successfully implement the programme. While some of this reflects the pace, preoccupations and processes of different departments, it also reflects a failure of leadership, drive and focus, at the top of Government, in recognising and optimising the contribution Common Frameworks can make to the resilience of the Union.”182

147.In addition, the Committee noted damage done to the common frameworks programme by the Internal Market Act 2020. It said:

“The market access principles in the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 could constrain the ability of the devolved administrations to regulate effectively in areas of devolved competence, as it is possible that their standards could be undercut from other parts of the UK. This would occur by the importation of goods and services from other parts of the UK that adhered to standards different from those of the administration concerned. The same also applies for the UK Government when legislating for England. This could be contrary, rather than complementary, to the approach taken in common frameworks, which can allow for intra-UK divergence as long as it is agreed by all parties to the framework.”183

148.The Scottish Government took a similar view in evidence to the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee:

“[T]he Common Frameworks programme has been put under strain by the unilateral—and wholly unnecessary—imposition of the Internal Market Act in 2020, and then by UK Ministers’ failure to honour assurances offered in both Houses of Parliament to follow agreed processes, and allow policy divergence agreed through a Common Framework to be excluded from the Act’s effects. The Internal Market Act 2020 embodies many of the wider challenges we face in establishing more equitable and sustainable [intergovernmental relations] … it undermined preceding collaborative efforts to establish agreed ways of working through common frameworks … .”184

149.With regard to the exclusion process, the Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee said:

“The UK Internal Market Act 2020 has damaged intergovernmental relations. This means it is all the more important that the exclusions process, which is essential for mitigating the effects of the Act, is made explicit in all relevant frameworks.”185

150.The Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee also expressed concern that common frameworks could “become a casualty of political fall-out in Northern Ireland”, where the absence of devolved institutions between February 2022 and February 2024 meant limited engagement in common frameworks by the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly.186

151.On 5 March 2024, following the fifth meeting of the Interparliamentary Forum in February 2024, the Chair of this Committee, Baroness Drake, wrote to Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, then Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, in his capacity as Minister for Intergovernmental Relations. Baroness Drake communicated the view of the Interparliamentary Forum that, with the re-establishment of the Northern Ireland Executive on 3 February 2024 “it may now be possible for some further progress to be made towards finalising the 28 Common Frameworks that are currently operating on a provisional basis”.187 In responding to the letter, Michael Gove agreed that “the restoration of devolved institutions in Northern Ireland will make it possible to make substantial progress in implementing Common Frameworks.”188

152.In written evidence, the Northern Ireland Executive Office told us that following the return of the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly: “Executive Office officials have been working jointly with their Scottish, Welsh and UK Government counterparts on the processes to finalise Common Frameworks once all relevant legislatures, including the NI Assembly, have had the opportunity to provide scrutiny of the recommendations.” It continued: “Finalisation will take place once recommendations from legislatures have been taken into account and the Common Frameworks have undergone a quality assurance check.”189

153.Despite significant setbacks—not least the collapse of devolved institutions in Northern Ireland in February 2022 and the criticisms levelled at the Internal Market Act 2020—common frameworks represent a positive example of intergovernmental cooperation, using a collaborative and consensus-driven approach.

154.When fully implemented common frameworks have the potential to develop UK-wide policy through collaboration and consensus, while also acknowledging the autonomy of each of the devolved administrations in their area of competence and allowing for policy divergence on the basis of consent. In the words of the Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee “[t]hey therefore have singular potential to strengthen cooperation between the administrations which is essential to maintaining the Union.”190

155.As part of our remit to keep under review constitutional aspects of devolution, this Committee maintains a watching brief on the operation of common frameworks. With the re–establishment of the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, we urge the new Government to mobilise every effort to finalise and fully implement all 32 common frameworks agreed between the UK Government and the devolved governments.


73 Cabinet Office, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities and Department for Culture, Media and Sport, ‘Collection: Intergovernmental relations’: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/intergovernmental-relations#annual-transparency-reports [accessed 19 September 2024]; Cabinet Office and Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, ‘Policy paper: Quarterly reports on intergovernmental relations’: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/quarterly-reports-on-intergovernmental-relations [accessed 19 September 2024]

74 Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, Intergovernmental Relations: Annual Report 2023 (April 2024), p 6: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6627a1e3838212a903a7e601/Intergovernmental_Relations_Annual_Report.pdf [accessed 19 September 2024]

75 Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, Intergovernmental Relations: Annual Report 2022 (March 2023), p 6: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/64243a393d885d000fdade27/IGR_Annual_Transparency_Report_2022.pdf [accessed 19 September 2024]

76 Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, Intergovernmental Relations: Annual Report 2023 (April 2024), pp 8–9: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6627a1e3838212a903a7e601/Intergovernmental_Relations_Annual_Report.pdf [accessed 19 September 2024]

77 Q 2 (Prof Ciaran Martin); Q 11 (Dr Philip Rycroft and Prof Jim Gallagher); Q 39 (Dr Lisa Caire Whitten); Written evidence from Dr Paul Anderson and Dr Coree Brown Swan (GOU0001); Q 96 (Rebecca Evans MS)

78 Q 11 (Dr Philip Rycroft)

79 Written evidence from Dr Elin Royles, Dr Carolyn Rowe and Dr Rachel Minto (GOU0003); Q 55 (Prof Laura McAllister)

80 Written evidence from the Senedd Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee (GOU0008)

81 Q 96 (Rebecca Evans MS)

82 51 (Dr Rowan Williams); written evidence from the Senedd Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee (GOU0008)

83 Constitution Committee, Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for the 21st Century (10th Report, Session 2021–22, HL Paper 142), para 178

84 Q 96 (Rebecca Evans MS)

85 Q 98 (Rebecca Evans MS)

86 Q 96 (Rebecca Evans MS)

87 Q 39 (Dr Lisa Claire Whitten)

88 Written evidence from Dr Elin Royles, Dr Carolyn Rowe and Dr Rachel Minto (GOU0003)

89 Ibid.

90 Written evidence from the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (GOU0006)

91 Written evidence from the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (GOU0006)

92 Q 54 (Dr Rowan Williams and Prof Laura McAllister)

93 Q 73 (Rt Hon David TC Davies MP)

94 Q 73 (Rt Hon Alister Jack MP)

95 Labour Party, Change: Labour Party Manifesto 2024, p 109: https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Labour-Party-manifesto-2024.pdf [accessed 20 September 2024]

96 Cabinet Office and Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, Policy paper: Review of intergovernmental relations (13 January 2022), para 1: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61df0068e90e07037ba76b4c/The_Review_of_Intergovernmental_Relations.pdf [accessed 20 September 2024]

97 Ibid., para 22

98 Written evidence from the Senedd Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee (GOU0008)

99 Scottish Parliament Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture Committee, How Devolution is Changing Post-EU (October 2023), paras 203–206: https://bprcdn.parliament.scot/published/CEEAC/2023/10/24/6692fb8e-0bf0-47cd-a1ba-cff461d9395d/CEEACS062023R5.pdf [accessed 20 September 2024]

100 Written evidence from the Northern Ireland Executive Office (GOU0013)

101 Q 16 (Dr Philip Rycroft); Q 54 (Prof Laura McAllister); written evidence from Dr Paul Anderson and Dr Coree Brown Swan (GOU0001); Q 121 (Rebecca Evans MS)

102 Q 11 (Prof Jim Gallagher)

103 Q 16 (Dr Philip Rycroft)

104 Q 54 (Prof Laura McAllister); written evidence from Dr Paul Anderson and Dr Coree Brown Swan (GOU0001), para 4

105 Written evidence from Dr Elin Royles, Dr Carolyn Rowe and Dr Rachel Minto (GOU0003)

106 Q 108 (Rebecca Evans MS)

107 Q 59 (Prof Laura McAllister)

108 Q 72 (Rt Hon David TC Davies MP)

109 Q 73 (Rt Hon David TC Davies MP)

110 Q 72 (Rt Hon Alister Jack MP)

111 QQ 100 and 102 (Rebecca Evans MS)

112 Q 100 (Rebecca Evans MS)

113 RDEL numbers are Resource Departmental Expenditure Limits and CDEL numbers are Capital Departmental Expenditure Limits. Both are limits on departmental spending set by the Treasury during spending reviews. Office for Budget Responsibility, ‘Departmental expenditure limits (DELs)’: https://obr.uk/forecasts-in-depth/tax-by-tax-spend-by-spend/departmental-expenditure-limits/ [accessed 20 September 2024]

114 Q 101 (Rebecca Evans MS)

115 Written evidence from the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (GOU0006)

116 HL Deb (18 January 2024), col 563

117 Written evidence from Northern Ireland Executive Office (GOU0013)

118 Written evidence from the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (GOU0006)

119 Written evidence from the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (GOU0006)

120 Q 20 (Dr Philip Rycroft)

121 Q 20 (Prof Jim Gallagher)

122 Q 4 (Prof Ciaran Martin)

123 Q 19 (Dr Philip Rycroft)

124 The Scottish Government defined a Gender Recognition Certificate as a certificate that legally recognises that a person’s gender is not the gender that they were assigned at birth but is their ‘acquired gender’. Scottish Parliament, ‘Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill (Overview)’: https://www.parliament.scot/bills-and-laws/bills/gender-recognition-reform-scotland-bill/overview [accessed 20 September 2024]

125 Scotland Act 1998, Section 35

126 Institute for Government, ‘The use of Section 35 of the Scotland Act to block the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill’ (9 October 2023): https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/section-35-scotland-gender-recognition-bill [accessed 20 September 2024]

127 Outer House, Court of Session, Opinion of Lady Haldane In the petition The Scottish Ministers [2023] CSOH 89, para 64

128 The Supreme Court, R (on the application of Miller and another (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appelant) [2017] UKSC 5

129 The Scottish Parliament Information Centre, ‘Court of Session decision on the use of section 35 of the Scotland Act 1998 in relation to the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill’ (13 December 2023): https://spice-spotlight.scot/2023/12/13/court-of-session-decision-on-the-use-of-section-35-of-the-scotland-act-1998-in-relation-to-the-gender-recognition-reform-scotland-bill/ [accessed 20 September 2024]

130 Scottish Government, ‘Section 35 judicial review’ (20 December 2023): https://www.gov.scot/news/section-35-judicial-review/ [accessed 20 September 2024]

131 UK in a Changing Europe, ‘The intergovernmental relations system and Scotland’s deposit return scheme (2 June 2023): https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-intergovernmental-relations-system-and-scotlands-deposit-return-scheme/ [accessed 20 September 2024]; House of Commons Library, ‘Will glass shatter plans for UK deposit return schemes?’ (28 November 2023): https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/will-glass-shatter-plans-for-uk-deposit-return-schemes/ [accessed 20 September 2024]

132 Scottish Government, ‘First Minister writes to Prime Minister: Deadline for UK Government to rethink on deposit return scheme’ (3 June 2023): https://www.gov.scot/news/first-minister-writes-to-prime-minister/ [accessed 20 September 2024]

133 Scottish Government, ‘Deposit Return’ (7 June 2023): https://www.gov.scot/news/deposit-return/ [accessed 20 September 2024]

134 Q 19 (Dr Philip Rycroft)

135 Written evidence from Dr Paul Anderson and Dr Coree Brown Swan (GOU0001), paras 5 and 8

136 Scottish Government, ‘Glue traps sales ban: letter to UK Government’ (31 March 2024): https://www.gov.scot/publications/glue-traps-sales-ban-letter-uk-government/ [accessed 20 September 2024]

137 Q 98 (Rebecca Evans MS)

138 Written evidence from the Senedd Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee (GOU0008)

139 Constitution Committee, Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom (11th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 146), para 170

140 Written evidence from Dr Elin Royles, Dr Carolyn Rowe and Dr Rachel Minto (GOU0003)

141 Q 11 (Prof Jim Gallagher)

142 Q 12 (Dr Philip Rycroft)

143 Q 13 (Dr Philip Rycroft)

144 Written evidence from the Senedd Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee (GOU0008)

145 Q 97 (Dr Andrew Goodall)

146 Written evidence from Dr Paul Anderson and Dr Coree Brown Swan (GOU0001)

147 Q 62 (Dr Rowan Williams)

148 Constitution Committee, Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom (11th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 146), para 170

149 Ibid., para 171

150 Written evidence from the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (GOU0006)

151 Q 77 (Rt Hon David TC Davies MP)

152 Q 72 (Rt Hon Alister Jack MP)

153 Q 76 (Rt Hon Alister Jack MP)

154 Written evidence from Dr Elin Royles, Dr Carolyn Rowe and Dr Rachel Minto (GOU0003)

155 Q 97 (Dr Andrew Goodall)

156 Letter from Michael Gove MP to Lord Dunlop on the government response to the Dunlop Review (24 March 2021): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/973001/L_Dunlop_Letter.pdf

157 Constitution Committee, Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for the 21st Century (10th Report, Session 2021–22, HL Paper 142), para 305

158 Written evidence from the Northern Ireland Executive Office (GOU0013)

159 Northern Ireland Office, Safeguarding the Union, CP 1021 (31 January 2024): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65ba3b7bee7d490013984a59/Command_Paper__1_.pdf [accessed 20 September 2024]

160 Written evidence from the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (GOU0006)

161 Q 73 (Lord Caine)

162 Written evidence from the Northern Ireland Executive Office (GOU0013)

163 Q 89 (Lord Caine)

164 Q 24 (Prof Jim Gallagher)

165 Q 42 (Dr Lisa Claire Whitten)

166 Ibid.

167 Written evidence from the Northern Ireland Assembly Committee for the Executive Office (GOU0009)

168 Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee, Common frameworks: an unfulfilled opportunity? (1st Report, Session 2022–23, HL Paper 41), para 1; Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, ‘UK Common Frameworks’ (22 December 2020): https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-common-frameworks [accessed 20 September 2024]

169 Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee, Common frameworks: an unfulfilled opportunity? (1st Report, Session 2022–23, HL Paper 41), Appendix 6

170 Ibid., Summary

171 Written evidence from the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (GOU0006)

172 Q 22 (Dr Philip Rycroft)

173 Written evidence from Dr Paul Anderson and Dr Coree Brown Swan (GOU0001)

174 Written evidence from the Scottish Government to the Scottish Affairs Committee, p 4: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/124908/pdf/

175 Written evidence from the Scottish Parliament’s Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture Committee (GOU0005)

176 Written evidence from the Senedd Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee (GOU0008)

177 Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee, Common frameworks: building a cooperative Union (1st Report, Session 2019–21, HL Paper 259), para 26

178 Ibid., para 27

179 Ibid., Summary

180 Letter from Baroness Andrews, then Chair to the House of Lords Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee to the Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, then Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (24 October 2023): https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41831/documents/207459/default/. Baroness Andrews is a member of the Constitution Committee.

181 Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee, Common frameworks: an unfulfilled opportunity? (1st Report, Session 2022–23, HL Paper 41), para 132

182 Letter from Baroness Andrews, then Chair to the House of Lords Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee to the Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, then Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (24 October 2023): https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41831/documents/207459/default/

183 Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee, Common frameworks: building a cooperative Union (1st Report, Session 2019–21, HL Paper 259), para 97

184 Written evidence from the Scottish Government to the Scottish Affairs Committee, p 4: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/124908/pdf/

185 Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee, Common frameworks: an unfulfilled opportunity? (1st Report, Session 2022–23, HL Paper 41), para 69

186 Ibid., para 96

187 Letter from Baroness Drake, Chair of the Constitution Committee, to Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, then Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (5 March 2024): https://www.parliament.uk/contentassets/d5367328de4a49379de99d02d908f94a/baroness-drake-to-rt-hon-michael-gove-mp-5-march-2024.pdf

188 Letter from the Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, then Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, to Baroness Drake, Chair of the Constitution Committee (21 March 2024): https://www.parliament.uk/contentassets/d5367328de4a49379de99d02d908f94a/2024–03-21---sos-to-baroness-drake.pdf

189 Written evidence from Northern Ireland Executive Office (GOU0013)

190 Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee, Common frameworks: an unfulfilled opportunity? (1st Report, Session 2022–23, HL Paper 41), para 20




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