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Beyond Brexit: how to win friends and influence people Contents

Chapter 3: Other inter-institutional mechanisms

Introduction

58.Aside from the formal inter-governmental mechanisms set out in the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, there are other means by which the UK may be able to exercise influence on the EU institutions and Member States. These include:

UK interaction with EU agencies

59.As an EU Member State, the UK participates in the work of over 40 EU agencies.63 The extent and means of any future UK interaction with these agencies remains unclear. In its July 2018 paper on The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, the Government proposed:

60.The paper noted that the UK would not be able to have voting rights, and that its participation in EU agencies would involve a number of commitments, including a financial contribution, respecting the rules under which EU agencies operated, and respect for the remit of the CJEU.64

61.As we have seen, the terms of the transition period envisage possible limited UK national expert participation in EU agencies.65 Under the terms of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, the EU’s executive agencies would also enjoy their normal powers within Northern Ireland.66

62.The Political Declaration on the future relationship refers to the possibility of UK cooperation with EU agencies, with specific reference to the European Medicines Agency, European Chemicals Agency and European Aviation Safety Agency.67 There are also commitments to “work together to identify the terms for the United Kingdom’s cooperation via Europol and Eurojust”,68 cooperation and information exchange with the European Maritime Safety Agency69 and European Border and Coastguard Agency,70 collaboration in projects of the European Defence Agency,71 and possible participation in certain activities of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security.72 However, the terms of such cooperation remain undefined, and the EU has consistently stressed that the autonomy of EU decision-making excludes the possibility of UK participation in the decision-making of EU agencies.

63.The UK has made a significant, and in many areas leading, contribution to the work of EU agencies during the period of its EU membership. This contribution will necessarily be curtailed following Brexit. While we welcome the commitments to future UK participation in and cooperation with certain EU agencies, the terms of such engagement are ill-defined. It is questionable whether the extent of UK participation that is envisaged will be sufficient to ensure that UK interests are represented and fully taken into account.

Participation in EU programmes and other areas of cooperation

64.The Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration present a wide-ranging, yet uneven and imprecise, picture of other potential areas of future UK-EU engagement and cooperation. The following summary illustrates the multi-layered complexity of this planned interaction.

Citizens’ rights

65.The European Commission and a UK “independent authority” will ensure effective implementation and application of citizens’ rights in their respective jurisdictions, possessing equivalent powers to investigate complaints, conduct inquiries and bring legal actions. The two bodies will each report annually on citizens’ rights to the Joint Committee, which will review the UK’s independent authority after eight years, and could then decide on its abolition.73

The transition period

66.As set out in Chapter 2, the terms of the transition period envisage possible limited UK national expert participation in meetings of Commission expert groups and/or EU bodies and offices.74

The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland

67.The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland envisages:

The Political Declaration

Overarching provisions

68.The overarching provisions of the Political Declaration on the future relationship include:

The economic partnership

69.The economic partnership provisions of the Political Declaration envisage:

The security partnership

70.The most detailed provisions on future cooperation fall under the security partnership section of the Political Declaration, which envisages a “broad, comprehensive and balanced security partnership”,88 including:

Conclusion

71.The Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration set out a complex, yet uneven and imprecise, picture of potential future UK-EU cooperation across a range of policy areas. The commitments and proposals set out vary considerably in terms of the level of cooperation; the extent to which commitments go beyond the rights and obligations of existing third countries; the extent to which either side is obliged to cooperate; the likely financial obligations; the criteria for deciding whether to proceed with potential cooperation; and the actors on either side who will be engaged. While we welcome the proposed mechanisms for cooperation as far as they go, given the lack of detail it is highly uncertain if they will be sufficient to serve the UK’s national interest.

72.We welcome the commitment to continued UK-EU cooperation in international fora, including the G7, the G20, NATO and the United Nations, in relation to climate change, sustainable development, cross-border pollution, public health and consumer protection, financial stability, the fight against trade protectionism, and the promotion of international peace and security. The UK will continue to make a strong contribution to international dialogue in these arenas.

The work of UKRep and other Brussels-based UK offices and organisations

The role of UKRep

73.As an EU Member State, the UK has sought to exert an influence through its dialogue with the EU institutions and other Member States, for instance in forging alliances with like-minded countries on proposals relating to the EU budget, the Single Market, financial services regulation and security cooperation. UK ministers and officials have in the process been able to form productive working relationships with their EU and Member State counterparts. This work has been led by the UK Representation to the EU in Brussels (UKRep).

74.Brexit will fundamentally change UKRep’s role. Not only will a change in nomenclature from a UK Representation to a UK Mission or Delegation be required, but the entire role and focus of UKRep will need to change from that of a Member State representation to a third country mission. UKRep will no longer have automatic access to information, for instance on the progress of legislative files or on issues under discussion. UK ministers and officials will no longer be able to conduct discussions in the margins (and have the same opportunities to build working relationships) with counterparts in the EU institutions and Member States.

75.As a result, the UK will need to learn to use alternative tools in seeking to exert influence and obtain information. This includes building and maintaining contacts with the EU institutions, including the European Parliament, and Member State Representations, to influence their consideration of draft EU legislation that will have implications for the UK. These are techniques already practised by existing third countries such as Switzerland and Norway. The Swiss and Norwegian missions in Brussels are among the largest of their diplomatic representations, reflecting the importance that both countries place on their bilateral relationship with the EU.

76.Sir Ivan Rogers, former UK Permanent Representative to the EU, told us:

“EU knowledge, international knowledge and negotiating knowledge has become very ghettoised, both at the centre and in departments … Fewer and fewer people understand both international negotiation generally and the EU. It has become a rarefied art … That will not work when you are on the outside.”93

77.Sir Ivan observed that UKRep would face the challenge of continuing to attract high-calibre officials when the UK was “no longer in the room”:

“If you are Swiss or Norwegian, the most glamorous post you could ever occupy at the top of the service is obviously the one in Brussels, because it is the most important. I do not think that will be the culture of the Foreign Office. People will always think that it is more glamorous being in Washington, Paris, Berlin or Beijing than in Brussels … We are going to have to persuade the next generation across domestic departments and in the Foreign Office that it is absolutely critical work for the future economic and security prosperity of the country. I think we will need more people in UKDel than we had in UKRep, and we are going to need them to be better plugged in.”94

78.In its January 2019 response to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on Delivering Global Britain: FCO Skills, the Government stated:

“29 March is the deadline for implementing changes to the Mission [to the EU] in advance of the implementation period. The size, structure and work of the future Mission will however, continue to evolve as we embed the UK’s future relationship with the EU. UKRep has already increased in size from over 120 to over 150, and will exceed 180 people.

“UKRep has already consulted widely with Third Country Missions in Brussels. As a result, we have carried out work including a robust business planning process for the implementation period and beyond, a programme to ensure staff have the specialist skills needed to deliver in the new working environment, and created a dedicated Public Diplomacy function to support new ways of working. Whilst UKRep will be a Third Country Mission, it will be in a unique position with its experience of, and relationships in, the EU Institutions providing a platform to promote UK interests.”95

79.The UK has, through the UK Representation to the EU (UKRep), sought to maximise the UK’s influence over the EU institutions and Member States. After Brexit UKRep will need to adjust to no longer being in the room, and losing the benefits of automatic access to information and the formal and informal dialogue with the EU institutions and Member States that membership brings. UKRep’s new status as a third country mission will present a different set of diplomatic challenges, in finding new ways to exert UK influence, gain access to information, and build relationships. The experience of other third countries suggests that the UK Government will, paradoxically, need to enhance its diplomatic presence in Brussels post-Brexit, and ensure that its officials are equipped with a different set of skills. We welcome the steps already taken to increase UKRep’s staffing, to train its officials, and to adapt its structure and focus: this must remain a top priority in coming months, and the Government must ensure that UKRep has sufficient staff and financial resources to undertake this crucial work.

Other Brussels-based UK offices and organisations

80.As well as UKRep, there is a breadth and mix of governmental and non-governmental expertise of various UK (and UK-linked) offices and organisations in Brussels. Each of the devolved administrations maintains an office in Brussels, as do the Governments of Gibraltar and the Crown Dependencies, the City of London, a number of regional and local authorities; and a wide range of business, cultural, education and other sectoral representatives.

81.Many of these bodies are in turn part of European sectoral networks, across a variety of policy spheres. Examples include;

82.These networks vary in terms of their formal status, the depth of their activity, the breadth of their membership, and whether participation is dependent on EU membership (some networks are pan-European, while some are EU-specific). However, continued participation in all such networks will remain an important tool for the UK post-Brexit.

83.Brexit has already provided an impetus to greater coordination between representatives of UK interests in the EU. Since November 2018, an informal network of officials of Brussels-based UK offices and organisations has been meeting, to build relationships, discuss issues of common interest arising from Brexit, and consider ways in which affected bodies and organisations might be able to work together more effectively to maximise their collective influence post-Brexit. The network is at an early stage of development, and does not yet have formal terms of reference or a permanent secretariat. However, it is considering ways in which its work might be formalised in the coming months.

84.The ability to exert influence post-Brexit will not be limited to the UK Government. There is a wide range of expertise and participation in EU networks, thanks to the numerous Brussels-based offices and organisations representing various UK interests. All have a part to play in maintaining UK influence and access to information.

85.We note in particular the important work undertaken by the offices of the devolved administrations in Brussels, and stress the role that they can play in contributing to and complementing the work of UKRep, including through effective engagement and exchange between officials.

86.Brussels-based UK offices and organisations are active and influential members of a wide range of European sectoral networks. It is vital that they should be able to maintain membership of and cooperation with such networks post-Brexit. We urge the Government to work with sectoral representatives to ensure that such cooperation can continue after Brexit, in particular in those cases where their participation in these networks is formally dependent on UK membership of the EU.

87.We welcome the establishment of an informal network of Brussels-based UK offices and organisations as a means of sharing expertise and seeking to coordinate the work of UK (or UK-linked) Brussels-based organisations. We look forward to seeing how the work of this group develops.

The role of the devolved administrations

Involvement in the Withdrawal Agreement inter-institutional structures

88.As we outlined in Chapter 2, the UK Government envisages the Northern Ireland Executive playing an important role in the formal inter-institutional structures (the Joint Committee, and the Specialised Committee and Joint Consultative Working Group envisaged under the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland) that relate to Northern Ireland.

89.The Government does not, however, appear to envisage extending such involvement in overseeing the Withdrawal Agreement to the other devolved administrations. In its January 2019 paper on UK Government commitments to Northern Ireland and its integral place in the United Kingdom, the Government stated: “This will apply solely to Northern Ireland specific issues—UK wide provisions are rightly a matter for the UK Government.”100 This statement appears to have been directed more to the Scottish and Welsh Governments than the Northern Ireland Executive.

90.While we understand the UK Government’s wish to ensure that it retains responsibility for UK-wide issues under discussion in the inter-institutional fora, we are not convinced that it is either realistic or wise to seek to carve out a role for the Northern Ireland Executive on Northern Ireland-specific issues without giving thought to the role that the devolved administrations as a whole might play. While most issues covered by the Joint Committee and Specialised Committee structure relate to UK competences, they will nevertheless engage the interests of the devolved administrations—citizens’ rights being a case in point.

91.The National Assembly of Wales External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee called for the Welsh Government to be part of the decision-making process that underpins the UK’s participation in UK-EU governance mechanisms. It also argued that there was a case for Welsh ministers to represent an agreed UK position, or for officials from devolved administrations to sit on technical committees.101

92.We acknowledge that the UK Government should assume overall responsibility for formal inter-institutional dialogue with the EU institutions as set out under the Withdrawal Agreement. Nevertheless, there remains a case for the devolved administrations to be ‘in the room’, if only in an observer capacity, whenever their interests (as well as their competences) are engaged, or when their technical expertise could be brought to bear. We urge the Government, in dialogue with the devolved administrations, to give careful thought to how this might be facilitated. We also stress the importance of effective communication and exchange between UK and devolved administration officials.

Involvement in the negotiations on the future relationship

93.Our Brexit: devolution report reflected on the dissatisfaction of the Scottish and Welsh Governments about the extent and nature of the UK Government’s engagement with them in the first phase of the Brexit negotiations.102 But on 21 January 2019 the Prime Minister made the following commitment, in a statement to the House of Commons, regarding the next phase of negotiations:

“While it will always be for Her Majesty’s Government to negotiate for the whole of the UK, we are also committed to giving the devolved Administrations an enhanced role in the next phase, respecting their competence and vital interests in these negotiations.”103

94.This commitment appeared to reflect a recognition that engagement with the devolved administrations thus far had been deficient. It also echoed the January 2019 paper on UK Government commitments to Northern Ireland and its integral place in the United Kingdom:

“It will … ultimately be in the development of our future relationship with the EU where it is most essential to establish the means for Belfast, Cardiff, Edinburgh and Westminster to come together to deliver growth and prosperity right across the UK. And we will ensure those interests are properly represented and reflected as we negotiate that future partnership with the EU. This will be alongside our existing commitment to ensure that all devolved institutions and interests are properly represented as we take forward our independent trade policy.”104

95.The Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, Rt Hon Stephen Barclay MP, acknowledged the concerns of the devolved administrations over the consultation process, and said that “the challenge is how we have quality [of dialogue] rather than just quantity”. One specific issue was the “tension between what you share with the House here and what you share with the devolved administrations. Obviously, there is a timing issue if you share with one and not the other, so it is about how we bridge that. But we are talking to them … There is an active programme to look at how we get a better relationship.”105

96.We welcome the Prime Minister’s commitment to enhancing the role of the devolved administrations in the negotiations on the future relationship. But actions speak louder than words. The Government needs to explain what it means by an “enhanced role”, and then implement this commitment, both in the context of the negotiations on the future relationship and in the oversight of the relationship itself. At the very least, this should involve a role for the devolved administrations in the dialogue at “summit, ministerial and technical level” envisaged in the Political Declaration, including the proposed Joint Committee on the future relationship. The devolved administrations need to reciprocate by playing a constructive role in the negotiations in the interests both of their own nations and regions, and of the UK as a whole.

97.The Government must also ensure that it continues to take into account and represent the interests of Gibraltar, the other Overseas Territories and the Crown Dependencies in relation to the negotiations on the future UK-EU relationship.

98.We consider the role of the devolved legislatures in Chapter 4.

Bilateral dialogue with EU Member States

99.The recalibration of bilateral relationships with individual Member States will also be an important aspect of post-Brexit UK-EU relations. As we have seen, the fact that the UK will no longer be ‘in the room’ means that an important means of formal and informal dialogue with EU Member States, both on EU-related matters and other issues of bilateral interest, will be lost. The Government needs to consider how bilateral relations can nonetheless be reinvigorated.

100.In its March 2018 response to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) report on The future of UK diplomacy in Europe, the Government set out the steps it had taken “to strengthen bilateral relationships with our European partners”:

101.We welcome the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s emphasis on revitalising bilateral links with EU Member States, and the increased resourcing of diplomatic missions across Member State capitals. Effective means for channelling information and knowledge between diplomatic missions and Whitehall will be equally important in years to come.

A case study: the UK-Ireland bilateral relationship

102.In response to a request from the FAC, the Government has produced a detailed analysis of the current status of the UK-Ireland bilateral relationship, and objectives for its post-Brexit evolution across all areas of common interest. The document expresses support for the Irish Government’s proposal for a regular joint inter-governmental meeting as a way of maintaining bilateral dialogue.108

103.At its meeting in November 2018, the British-Irish Inter-governmental Conference (one of the east-west institutions established under Strand Three of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement) discussed “possible models for ensuring that the high level of bilateral co-operation between the United Kingdom and Ireland is maintained and strengthened following the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union”. The Conference agreed that these new structures should:

“Clearly demonstrate the strength and depth of the relationship; provide opportunities for ministers and officials to continue to engage both formally and informally with each other; and to maintain the spirit of cooperation that has been engendered through such contacts in an EU context; as well as provide an overall architecture for cooperation that is both meaningful and sustainable in the future.”

Officials were asked to take forward more detailed work in this area for consideration at a future meeting.109

104.In our December 2016 report on Brexit: UK-Irish relations, we concluded that closer UK-Irish relations were too important to be put at risk by Brexit. We therefore welcome the commitment of both the UK and Irish Governments to developing that relationship post-Brexit, and to considering proposals for regular ministerial and official-level exchanges, including regular inter-governmental meetings. We invite the Government to provide an update on the form this dialogue might take.

105.Although the UK-Ireland bilateral relationship is uniquely close, there could be merit in applying aspects of this model to other key bilateral relationships with EU Member States, in particular those with whom the UK shares close geographical, economic, societal and security links. We urge the Government to engage with remaining EU Member States to seek to establish mechanisms for regular bilateral inter-governmental dialogue at both ministerial and official level.

63 For a full list, see European Union, ‘Agencies and other EU Bodies’ (12 December 2017): https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies_en [accessed 14 March 2019].

64 HM Government, The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, Cm 9593, July 2018: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/725288/The_future_relationship_between_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_European_Union.pdf [accessed 14 March 2019]

65 See para 11.

66 Withdrawal Agreement (11 March 2019), Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Article 14(5)

67 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), para 24

68 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), para 88

69 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), para 65

70 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), para 116

71 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), para 104

72 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), para 111

73 Withdrawal Agreement (11 March 2019), Article 159. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: acquired rights (10th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 82) and Letter from Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws to Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, Home Secretary (27 February 2019): https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-justice-subcommittee/CWM/HKtoSJ-SettledStatus-260219.pdf.[accessed 19 March 2019]

74 See para 11.

75 Withdrawal Agreement (11 March 2019), Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Article 10 of Annex 4

76 Withdrawal Agreement (11 March 2019), Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Article 14(7)

77 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), paras 10, 125. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: Agriculture (20th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 169), paras 203 and 207 (on EFSA); European Union Committee, Brexit: energy security (10th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 63), Box 3 and paras 93, 95–6 and 101 (on ACER); and European Union Committee, Brexit: plant and animal biosecurity (21st Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 191), paras 69–71 (on the Working Party of Chief Veterinary Officers).

78 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), para 11. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: energy security (10th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 63), paras 104–112; European Union Committee, Brexit: plant and animal biosecurity report (21st Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 191), paras 80–89; European Union Committee, Brexit: the Erasmus and Horizon programmes (28th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 283).

79 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), paras 12–13. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-Irish relations (6th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 76), paras 184–194.

80 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), para 14. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: EU student exchanges and funding for university research (28th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 283), Chapter 4.

81 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), para 15. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: the European Investment Bank (25th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 269), paras 57–65.

82 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), paras 33–36

83 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), para 39. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: the future of financial regulation and supervision (11th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 66), Chapter 6.

84 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), paras 64–65

85 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), paras 66–67. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: energy security (10th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 63) Box 3 and paras 93–6, 101.

86 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), paras 68–71. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: energy security (10th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 63), paras 170, 177–183.

87 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), paras 72, 77–78. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: environment and climate change (12th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 109), paras 117–135.

88 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), paras 80–81. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty (18th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 164).

89 See paras 59 and 62.

90 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), paras 82–91. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: future UK-EU security and police cooperation (7th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 77) and European Union Committee, Brexit: judicial oversight of the European Arrest Warrant (6th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 16).

91 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), paras 92–109. For further discussion, see European Union Committee, Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations (16th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 132). The EU External Relations Sub-Committee is currently undertaking an inquiry into UK-EU international development cooperation after Brexit. See EU External Relations Sub-Committee ‘UK-EU international development cooperation after Brexit’: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/inquiries/parliament-2017/international-development-cooperation-after-brexit/ [accessed 14 March 2019]..

92 Political Declaration (11 March 2019), paras 110–117

93 Oral evidence taken on 20 February 2019 (Session 2017–19), Q 10 (Sir Ivan Rogers)

94 Ibid.

95 Foreign Affairs Committee, Delivering Global Britain: FCO Skills: Government response to the Committee’s Fourteenth Report of Session 2017–19 (Nineteenth Special Report, Session 2017–19, HC 1937)

96 See European Union Committee, Brexit: energy security (10th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 63), paras 99 and 102

97 See European Union Committee, Brexit: environment and climate change (12th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 109), paras 142–4, 146

98 European Committee of the Regions, Minutes of 188th meeting of the Bureau of the European Committee of the Regions, 5 February 2019, available at https://memportal.cor.europa.eu/Agenda/Documents?meetingId=2152295&meetingSessionId=2188822 [accessed 14 March 2019]

99 See European Union Committee, Brexit: the Erasmus and Horizon programmes (28th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 283)

100 HM Government, UK Government commitments to Northern Ireland and its integral place in the United Kingdom (9 January 2019): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/769964/NI_unilateral_commitments_-_9_January_FINAL.pdf [accessed 14 March 2019]

101 Letter from the National Assembly for Wales External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee, (11 February 2019): https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-select/interinstitutional-relations-inquiry/welsh-external-affairs-response.pdf [accessed 19 March 2019]

102 European Union Committee, Brexit: devolution (4th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 9), Chapter 7

103 HC Deb, 21 January 2019, col 27

104 HM Government, UK Government commitments to Northern Ireland and its integral place in the United Kingdom (9 January 2019): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/769964/NI_unilateral_commitments_-_9_January_FINAL.pdf [accessed 9 January 2019]

105 Oral evidence taken on 23 January 2019 (Session 2017–19), Q 5 (Stephen Barclay MP)

106 These staff are being deployed to UK missions in Ankara, Athens, Belgrade, Berlin, Berne, Bratislava, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Copenhagen, Dublin, Helsinki, Istanbul, Lisbon, Ljubljana, Luxembourg, Madrid, Nicosia, Oslo, Paris, Prague, Riga, Rome, Skopje, Sofia, Stockholm, Tallinn, The Hague, Tirana, Valletta, Vienna, Vilnius, Warsaw and Zagreb, as well as to the UK Permanent Representation to the EU in Brussels, and to the UK Mission to the UN in Vienna.

107 Foreign Affairs Committee, The future of UK diplomacy in Europe: Government response to the Committee’s Second Report (Fifth Special Report, Session 2017–19, HC 514)

108 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Analysis of UK-Ireland Relationship (24 July 2018): https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/foreign-affairs/Correspondence/2017–19/OFFICIAL-Analysis-of%20UK-Ireland-bilateral-relationship-(FAC)-Final.pdf [accessed 7 March 2019]

109 HM Government, ‘Joint communique of the British-Irish intergovernmental conference 2 November 2018’, (2 November 2018): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-communique-of-the-british-irish-intergovernmental-conference-2-november-2018 [accessed 7 March 2019]



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